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Abstract
Background: Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are highly active in many sub-Saharan African
countries, serving as an important gateway for coping with financial risk. In light of the Kenya’s National Hospital
Insurance Fund’s (NHIF’s) strategy of targeting ROSCAs for membership enrolment, this study sought to estimate
how ROSCA membership influences the determinants of voluntary health insurance enrolment.
Methods: A cross-sectional survey of 444 households was carried out in Kisumu City between July and August
2016. A structured questionnaire was administered on health insurance membership, household attributes,
headship characteristics and health-seeking behaviour. We assessed the influence of ROSCA membership on the
associations between NHIF enrolment and the explanatory variables using univariate logistic regression.
Results: The study found that education was associated with NHIF demand regardless of ROSCA membership.
Both ROSCA and non-ROSCA households with high socioeconomic status showed stronger health insurance
demand compared with poorer households; there was, however, no evidence that the strength of this association
was influenced by ROSCA status (p-value = 0.47). Participants who were self-employed were significantly less likely
to enrol into the NHIF if they did not belong to a ROSCA (interaction test p-value = 0.03). NHIF enrolment was
found to be lower among female-headed households. There was a borderline effect of ROSCA membership on
this association, with a lower odds ratio amongst non-ROSCA members (p-value = 0.09): the low treatment numbers
amongst the insured infers that ROSCA membership may play a role on the association between gender and NHIF
demand.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that ROSCA membership may play a role in increasing health insurance demand
amongst some traditionally under-represented groups such as women and the self-employed. However, the
strategy of targeting ROSCAs to increase national health insurance enrolment may yield exiguous results, given
that ROSCA membership is itself influenced by several non-observable factors – such as time-availability and self-
selection. It is therefore important to anchor outreach to ROSCAs within a broader, multi-pronged approach that
targets households within their social, economic and political realities.
Keywords: ROSCAs, Health insurance, Social capital, Kenya
* Correspondence: tessa.oraro@swisstph.ch
1Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, Basel, Switzerland
2University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Oraro and Wyss International Journal for Equity in Health          (2018) 17:170 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-018-0889-7
Introduction
Informal economic networks based on geographical,
sociocultural or occupational proximity are highly ac-
tive in many sub-Saharan African countries, with an es-
timated 24% of the population participating in local
savings clubs in 2014 [9]. In Kenya, where 24.6% of the
population is excluded from formal savings and loans
institutions, local rotating savings and credit associa-
tions (ROSCAs) have emerged as important gateways
for coping with financial instability [7]. ROSCAs are
typically created to meet an unmet social and economic
need amongst vulnerable groups such as the working
poor and women [2, 9], with participants pooling their
financial resources to create communal savings funds
as a form of financial risk protection [42]. In this sense,
ROSCAs serve as social networks through which individ-
uals obtain financial security through collective resource
mobilisation. Due to their informal nature, ROSCAs’
success is contingent upon the trust, reciprocity and col-
lective strength shared amongst group members – funda-
mental components of a phenomenon known as social
capital [12, 42]. It is this reliance on social capital that has
driven the use of similar welfare associations as launch-
pads for the national health insurance schemes in Germany
and Japan [6, 36].
Against the backdrop of increasing ROSCA member-
ship across sub-Saharan Africa, financial risk protection
in health care has remained low. Several governments
in the region such as those in Ghana and Kenya have
sought to promote national health insurance schemes
as a means of minimising the high out-of-pocket costs
associated with ill health [38, 39]. In Kenya – where up
to 28% of slum-dwelling households face catastrophic
health expenditure [5] – the national government has
established the National Hospital Insurance Fund
(NHIF) as a means of providing financial risk protec-
tion to its citizens. The NHIF operates like most na-
tional health insurance schemes in the region, with the
government and the formal sector providing the bulk of
financial contributions to the scheme [40]. However,
given the high levels of informal employment in the
Kenyan economy, the depth of insurance coverage has
remained low, with only 13.5% of the population receiv-
ing NHIF coverage [20]. A large proportion of Kenya’s
informally employed households – who constitute 85%
of the working population – are thus left susceptible to
financial shocks in the event of ill health [20, 41]. This
problem echoes findings across health insurance
schemes in several sub-Saharan countries, where low
health insurance demand has been attributed to high
levels of labour informality.
As part of efforts to better understand the reasons
behind the low uptake of voluntary health insurance,
several research studies have identified a link between
social solidarity and health insurance demand across
various sub-Saharan African settings [1, 14]. This grow-
ing body of evidence has led Kenyan policymakers to
target ROSCAs as a means of increasing NHIF demand
amongst the informal sector, in line with their role as ve-
hicles for social solidarity [33]. Consequently, we seek to
understand how ROSCA membership influences the
drivers of voluntary health insurance in Kisumu, Kenya.
This paper will be structured as follows: We will first
provide a review of the research on the intersection be-
tween local group membership, social capital, and volun-
tary health insurance membership. We will subsequently
report our methodology and results, and conclude with
an analysis of our findings.
In order to better understand the mechanisms through
which ROSCAs may influence health insurance enrol-
ment, it is first necessary to define the social capital
underpinning the success of ROSCAs. Social capital as a
concept focuses on the utility of relationships and re-
sources in facilitating collaboration towards a common
goal [4, 8, 34]. While different interpretations of its nature
and effect exist, it is generally agreed that social capital in-
fluences the depth of individuals’ engagement with local
and national structures by facilitating trust and reciprocity
within communities. ROSCAs – as local informal group-
ings – seek to empower economic cooperation in the face
of complex resource and capacity constraints. In doing so,
they tap into two key dimensions of social capital: intra-
and inter-community collaborations. When constituting
ROSCAs in low-resource settings, members often recruit
those in whom they have inherent trust – ostensibly those
with similar socioeconomic, professional or ethno-cultural
characteristics. This structure mimics traditional African
obligations to familial and tribal alliances [3], and de-
rives its power from harnessing existing links within
homogenous groups: a concept known as bonding social
capital [30]. Concurrently, in order to make ROSCAs sus-
tainable, members seek to increase the associations’ capital
base and minimise the risk of default [2]. They thus ex-
pand their radius of trust beyond their typical personal,
sociocultural and organisational bases - a phenomenon
known as bridging social capital [30]. In this vein, ROS-
CAs foment economic, social, and cultural links within
local communities [35].
In spite of the pervasiveness of ROSCAs and their link-
ages to national health insurance enrolment in several
sub-Saharan African settings [24, 27], there remains a pau-
city of research on the influence of ROSCAs on national
health insurance demand. We can, however, draw lessons
from studies carried out on the influence of social capital
as a general concept on voluntary health insurance enrol-
ment. According to existing research, active members of
local mutual assistance groups such as ROSCAs are more
likely to be part of voluntary health insurance schemes
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due to a shared ethos of social cooperation [11, 15, 31].
These findings highlight the importance of common
norms, values and objectives – characteristic features of
social capital – in influencing households’ decision to
enrol into voluntary health insurance. Given this, our
paper will seek to answer the following research question:
How does ROSCA membership influence the determi-
nants of voluntary health insurance enrolment? We will
further seek to understand how existing knowledge on so-
cial capital can help explain the influence of ROSCAs on
the determinants of health insurance demand.
In order to answer these questions, we can apply several
hypotheses to our study based on the findings of existing
research. Given the link identified between local informal
group membership and social capital, we anticipate that
non-ROSCA members may have weaker bonding and
bridging social capital compared with their ROSCA mem-
ber counterparts. As a result of this, we expect wealth to
manifest as an overarching determinant of NHIF demand
amongst non-ROSCA members in line with existing na-
tional health financing studies [10, 17, 18, 24, 26, 27].
Additionally, we hypothesise that sociocultural sensitivities
such as household composition; gender of household
head; and marital status will influence households’ likeli-
hood of enrolling into national health insurance [10, 17,
18, 24–27]. We however postulate that these inequities
may be reduced by ROSCA membership due to their high
social capital stock.
Methodology
Sampling methodology
A cross-sectional household survey was carried out in
Kisumu City between July and August 2016 to identify
the extent to which NHIF enrolment is influenced by
ROSCA membership; household composition and attri-
butes; as well as household head characteristics such as
occupation, age, gender and perceived health status of
household members.
Our study aimed to estimate the proportion of the in-
formally employed population with voluntary NHIF
health insurance, and to assess the association between
explanatory variables and this proportion. In order to
achieve these aims, we calculated the sample size based
on the ability to estimate the proportion insured with a
certain precision - in this case, with an expected NHIF
population coverage of 13.8% [29]. Using the Hayes and
Bennett equation and taking into account clustering in
six sub-locations across Kisumu, required sample size
was calculated to be 440 households with the precision
of a 95% confidence interval with a width of 10 to 18%
[16]. The number of households interviewed in each
sub-location was proportional to its demographic size,
which was obtained from the 2009 Kenya Population
and Housing Census [22].
Multistage cluster sampling was used to obtain the
study sample, with enumeration maps of the six
sub-locations used to randomly identify existing infor-
mal settlements in Kisumu [19]. In the second stage,
we selected existing water points within informal set-
tlements, and randomly selected starting points lo-
cated near the water points. This strategy was driven
by the use of watering points as navigation tools by
the local communities. We subsequently carried out
systematic sampling, with every nth household inter-
viewed. Approximately 98% of the targeted households
could be interviewed.
Data collection
The survey was administered as a structured question-
naire using Open Data Kit (ODK) software on handheld
tablets to answer questions on household composition;
household assets; household expenditure and consump-
tion; and health-seeking behaviour. Research assistants
who were fluent in English, Kiswahili and the local dialect,
Luo, and who had knowledge of the local geographical
and sociocultural context were hired. Training was pro-
vided to familiarise research assistants with the question-
naire and data collection using handheld tablets.
Household heads were targeted as the primary respon-
dents for this study. In cases where the household head
was not available, their spouse was interviewed.
In order to identify the informally employed in our
study area, we used a deductive approach of identifying
households where the household head did not make
mandatory monthly payments into the National Social
Security Fund (NSSF). This approach was taken, as
there is no clearly defined approach for identifying the
informal sector in Kenya. However, the formal sector is
defined distinctly within Kenya’s legal framework, with
sector members legally obligated to make monthly pen-
sion payments to the NSSF [32].
Insured households were defined as those where mem-
bers were voluntarily enrolled into the NHIF in the year
preceding the study.
Statistical analysis
The data were analysed using STATA version 14.1 for
Windows (STATA Corporation, College Station, Texas).
The main outcome variable was voluntary enrolment
into the NHIF in the previous year. The explanatory var-
iables were divided into five components: household
composition and attributes; household head factors; per-
ceived household health status; and proxies for exposure
to financial risk pooling.
In order to measure wealth, we used the asset index
as described within the Kenya Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) to calculate households’ asset-based wealth
[21]. We collected data on consumer items, dwelling
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characteristics such as housing materials, water source,
sleeping arrangements, and other characteristics linked to
wealth status. We subsequently computed the asset index.
Households were then classified into one of five socioeco-
nomic groups based on quintiles (Q): Q1 or the poorest
20%; Q2; Q3; Q4; and Q5 or the wealthiest 20% in the
sample. These groups were subsequently clustered into
three groups: Q1 and Q2; Q3 and Q4; and Q5 respect-
ively, to account for the minimal differences amongst the
proximal quintiles. Literacy within the study context was
defined as those above the age of 15 years who could read
and write [37]. The mean perceived health status of each
household was calculated as the average self-reported
health status value for all household members. The final
value of the mean perceived health status was assigned a
value of between 1 and 4, with 1 being “very good” health
status; 2 being “good” health status; 3 being “poor” health
status; and 4 being “very poor” health status.
We used multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression
models to estimate the association between health insur-
ance enrolment and the explanatory variables. We took
the clustering of households at the village level into ac-
count using random effects for village. In light of the
low numbers of insured households within our study
population, it was not possible to include multiple covar-
iates simultaneously in the model. Therefore, univariate
models were run to estimate the association of each vari-
able and health insurance enrolment for the ROSCA
and non-ROSCA households respectively. We ran the
regression models for (i) ROSCA and non-ROSCA sep-
arately to easily gain estimates of the univariate odds ra-
tios and 95% confidence intervals; and (ii) on the full
dataset with ROSCA and non-ROSCA households in
order to use interaction terms to directly test whether
the associations between each covariate and NHIF enrol-
ment were affected by ROSCA membership. Each model
included the covariate, ROSCA membership, and the
interaction term as explanatory variables.
Results
Study population characteristics
A total of 444 households were enumerated in the
survey, with ROSCA member households accounting
for 63% of the study population. Approximately 29% of
ROSCA households and 23% of non-ROSCA house-
holds were voluntarily enrolled into the NHIF. While
ROSCA members are actively targeted by the NHIF for
enrolment, our study did not find a statistically signifi-
cant association between ROSCA membership and health
insurance enrolment (OR: 1.33 [0.85–2.09]). Table 1 re-
ports the differences in each test variable according to
insurance status and household ROSCA membership
status.
Most household heads in our study population re-
ported themselves as economically active, with 94% of
respondents carrying out casual income-generating ac-
tivities in lieu of formal employment. The most common
economic activities amongst our study population were
small-scale business ventures, with 56% of the popula-
tion engaging in activities such as carpentry, masonry,
and hairdressing. This notwithstanding, our findings re-
vealed that 26% of our study population lived below the
poverty line, which is defined as a household income of
less than $1.90 a day [41].
The household characteristics and health status for the
sample population were broadly similar regardless of
ROSCA membership status. Overall, the median house-
hold size was 4, with 77% of all households having chil-
dren below the age of 15 years. The number of households
with elderly members was low across the study popula-
tion, with only 8% of households having members above
the age of 65 years. The study population also showed
similarities in the gender and marital status of household
heads, irrespective of ROSCA membership status. Further,
the study found similarities in the mean household health
status, with 5% of households reporting the presence of
chronic disease.
The study found important distinctions in the economic
characteristics of ROSCA and non-ROSCA households.
ROSCA members were more likely to have more than one
earner in the household and higher monthly incomes
compared to non-members.
Factors associated with voluntary health insurance
enrolment amongst ROSCA and non-ROSCA member
households
Household-level regression results are presented in Table 2
for ROSCA and non-ROSCA member households.
Our study found that education and asset-based SES
were associated with NHIF demand, regardless of
ROSCA membership status. Household heads in the
study population were more likely to enrol into the na-
tional health insurance scheme if they were educated to
at least secondary school level (OR = 1.80 (CI:1.05–3.11)
for ROSCA members, and OR = 3.23 (CI:1.47–7.08) for
non-ROSCA members (interaction test = 0.84). Our find-
ings also suggest that SES was associated with health in-
surance demand, although there was no evidence that the
strength of the association was influenced by ROSCA
membership status (p-value = 0.47).
Our analysis showed that the relationship between
NHIF enrolment and some socio-demographic and eco-
nomic variables could be influenced by a household’s
ROSCA status. The study found that household heads
that were self-employed or had no fixed employment
were significantly less likely to enrol into the NHIF if
they did not belong to a ROSCA (p-value = 0.03).
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Our findings also raise the possibility of a stronger rela-
tionship between gender and national health insurance de-
mand if one does not belong to a ROSCA than if one does
(p-value = 0.09). According to our analysis, non-ROSCA
female household heads were less likely to enrol into the
NHIF compared with their male counterparts (OR = 0.29
(CI:0.11–0.79). The odds ratio among the ROSCA mem-
ber group was 0.65 (CI:0.35–1.23). Given the low treat-
ment numbers amongst the insured, the borderline effect
of ROSCA membership on the relationship between gen-
der and health insurance demand infers that it may play
an influencing role on the association between the ex-
planatory variable and NHIF enrolment.
In addition to the above associations, our findings sug-
gest that NHIF demand may increase if the household
head was married or received a fixed salary. There was,
however, no evidence that these associations were influ-
enced by ROSCA membership.
Discussion
This study investigated the influence of informal finan-
cial coping mechanisms on the demand for formal, more
Table 1 Descriptive statistics by gender and insurance status
ROSCA member Non-ROSCA member
Insured
(n = 38)
Uninsured
(n = 125)
Combined
(n = 163)
Insured
(n = 81)
Uninsured
(n = 200)
Combined
(n = 281)
Household characteristics
Median household sizeb 4 (3,5) 4 (3,5) 4 (3,5) 5 (3,6) 4 (3,5) 4 (3,5)
Households with children <=5 years 48% 59% 56% 61% 58% 58%
Households with children <=15 years 75% 76% 76% 84% 78% 79%
Households with elderly > = 60 years 11% 6% 7% 8% 10% 10%
Average socioeconomic status (SES)
scoreaa
3.47 (0.28) 2.95 (0.27) 3.19 (0.27) 3.16 (0.21) 2.69 (0.26) 2.80 (0.25)
% of poor households (Q1-Q2) 26% 42% 37% 29% 50% 45%
% of rich households (Q5) 32% 18% 22% 18% 15% 16%
Annual average household expenditure
(KShs)a
365,060
(154435)
361,195
(734010)
362,309
(624283)
373,513
(571020)
230,524
(208211)
263,859
(333668)
Household head characteristics
Median ageb 39 (29,45) 35 (28,40) 36 (27,40) 34 (27,42) 35 (26,39) 35 (27,40)
Female household heads 21% 29% 26% 13% 34% 29%
Secondary-level education and above 63% 49% 53% 71% 43% 50%
Married household heads 83% 72% 75% 87% 66% 71%
Paid employee 38% 38% 38% 61% 30% 37%
Small-scale business owner 56% 57% 57% 32% 62% 55%
No fixed employment 6% 5% 5% 8% 7% 7%
More than one earner 52% 32% 37% 39% 19% 24%
Profits as remuneration 27% 24% 25% 18% 18% 18%
% living below poverty linec 14% 20% 19% 39% 38% 38%
Household health status
Mean health statusa 2.04 (0.59) 1.96 (0.52) 1.98 (0.54) 2.03 (0.51) 2.04 (0.56) 2.04 (0.55)
Presence of chronic disease 4% 6% 5% 3% 7% 6%
Use of curative services
Outpatient service use in past 30 days 48% 49% 48% 45% 37% 39%
Inpatient service use in past year 36% 25% 28% 16% 22% 21%
Annual per capita health expenditure
(KShs)a
1729 (18607) 739 (3542) 1025 (10516) 569 (2946) 818 (6442) 760 (5821)
aMean (±Standard Deviation)
bMedian (Inter-Quartile Range)
cPoverty line defined as households living on less than $1.90 a day
1USD = 102.45 KShs as of January 2018
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secure forms of financial risk protection in health. Be-
fore probing the associations between ROSCA mem-
bership and health insurance enrolment, it is first
necessary to examine the overarching determinants of
NHIF demand within the general population sample.
According to our findings, the NHIF has been success-
ful in providing inclusive health insurance coverage re-
gardless of household composition or health status.
This may be attributed to the NHIF’s benefit structure,
which enables a household to enrol all its identified de-
pendants under a fixed premium irrespective of their
individual circumstances. While successful in expand-
ing coverage amongst the above-mentioned groups in
our study area, we found that the NHIF still faces chal-
lenges in increasing health insurance demand amongst
key vulnerable population groups, including those with
low levels of education and limited asset-based wealth.
These findings reflect similar national health financing
studies across sub-Saharan Africa that have identified a
positive correlation between health insurance demand
and a household head’s educational or asset-based so-
cioeconomic status [10, 17, 25–27].
Viewed through the prism of ROSCA membership,
our results inferred that sociocultural disenfranchise-
ment due to female household headship reduced NHIF
demand amongst those not involved in local ROSCAs.
However, further analysis revealed that these sociocul-
tural constraints on NHIF enrolment were limited
amongst ROSCA members. With this in mind, it is ne-
cessary to examine how ROSCA membership changes
the terms under which households engage with national
power structures.
According to Mladovsky and Mossialos’ social capital
framework, bridging capital is vital in building norms
and rules to facilitate productive behaviour in individuals
[30]. Amongst these norms is the sharing of information
Table 2 Univariate logistic estimates for probability of purchasing NHIF health insurance at household level
ROSCA members (n = 163) Non-ROSCA members (n = 281) Interaction* (n = 444)
Variable description Odds ratio CI Odds ratio CI p-value
Household characteristics
Presence of children < 15 years 0.92 0.49–1.72 1.54 0.59–4.05 0.50
Presence of elderly > 60 years 1.93 0.76–4.90 0.74 0.20–2.74 0.15
Socioeconomic status (Reference group: First and second quintiles)
Middle wealth 1.71 0.91–3.23 2.56 1.12–5.88 0.47
Wealthiest quintile 2.81 1.38–5.73 2.08 0.71–6.10
Household head characteristics
Sex of household head (Reference group: Male)
Female 0.65 0.35–1.23 0.29 0.11–0.79 0.09
Age (Reference group: ≤24 years)
25–29 years 0.71 0.27–1.90 1.29 0.35–4.72 0.16
30–45 years 0.92 0.38–2.22 2.16 0.65–7.17
46–59 years 1.92 0.68–5.42 1.79 0.41–7.86
60+ years 1.92 0.59–6.24 0.42 0.04–4.18
Education (Reference group: Primary level or less)
Secondary education or higher 1.80 1.05–3.11 3.23 1.47–7.08 0.84
Employment type (Reference group: Paid employees)
Self-employed 0.95 0.55–1.66 0.25 0.11–0.57 0.03
No fixed employment 1.15 0.35–3.75 0.55 0.14–2.25
Remuneration (Reference group: Fixed salary)
Daily/hourly pay 0.70 0.29–1.71 0.20 0.07–0.53 0.19
Task-based payment 0.52 0.23–1.14 0.15 0.05–0.44
Business profits 0.76 0.33–1.76 0.32 0.11–0.95
Marital status (Reference group: Unmarried)
Married 1.87 0.96–3.64 3.46 1.26–9.51 0.57
Presence of chronic illness in household 0.65 0.17–2.44 0.35 0.43–2.84 0.46
*The p-values assess whether the association between each variable and NHIF membership is significantly different for the ROSCA and non-ROSCA households
The odds in the reference group are multiplied by the odds ratio for each category
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and resources amongst socially heterogeneous groups,
in order to create a fair market. In the context of ROS-
CAs, regular social and economic interaction mini-
mizes the information and power asymmetry witnessed
in the general population. ROSCAs thus challenge the
power structures that are inherent within our study
area by developing a common identity under which het-
erogeneous groups interact. This implies that ROSCAs
may foster social cohesion amongst its members, osten-
sibly by arming different sociocultural groups with the
information and financial resources to better under-
stand and afford NHIF membership.
Based on our findings, however, it is, notable from our
findings that ROSCA membership does not exclusively
negate the influence of sociocultural biases on national
health insurance demand. Cognisant of this, we postu-
late that the social alliances within ROSCAs are ultim-
ately subservient to the economic power held by
individuals. It is generally accepted that many ROSCAs
exclude those unable to pay their dues during each pay-
ment cycle [13]. This means that the wealthy either
self-select into the ROSCAs, or ultimately exclude their
poorer counterparts due to non-payment of fees [2].
This leads to the pervasive exclusion of the economically
marginalised, thus disempowering actors with weak eco-
nomic agency. The role of potential ostracism in limiting
the bridging social capital in ROSCAs is observed by the
fact that the wealthier business owners in our study
setting, either due to high household head income or
multiple earners, were over-represented in ROSCA
households. It is for this reason that we found that
small-scale business owners were more likely to be en-
rolled into the NHIF if they had ROSCA membership.
It is important to view the findings of this manuscript
within the context of the NHIF’s broader Universal
Health Coverage (UHC) strategy in Kenya. Since 2015,
the Kenyan Government has provided fully subsidised
NHIF coverage to indigents across the country through
the Health Insurance Subsidy Programme for the Poor
(HISP). This scheme has set the ambitious goal of expand-
ing health insurance coverage to 9 million indigents across
the country by 2020 [28]. Additionally, in 2016, the Ken-
yan Government began offering free maternity services
(FMS) to all Kenyan women through the NHIF (Kenya
National [23]). With these programmes in mind, the
NHIF’s ROSCA targeting strategy would ostensibly be tar-
geted towards a narrow group of informal sector workers
who have some degree of economic agency. With this nu-
anced lens, the NHIF’s strategy of targeting the informal
sector through ROSCAs may be feasible, given their alter-
native means of targeting those at the bottom of the pyra-
mid through premium subsidisation. However, the success
of these strategies will be highly dependent upon the
successful planning and execution of these collaborative
strategies as collective, as well as effectively identifying
households at the bottom of the pyramid.
Given the indefinite nature of social capital, care must
be taken in viewing the associations reported in this study
as causal. We must also acknowledge that the structures
of ROSCAs and their relationships with stocks of social
capital will vary considerably. We note that ROSCA mem-
bership may be influenced by several non-observable fac-
tors, such as time-availability and self-selection, which
directly impact one’s ability to participate in ROSCAs. We
further acknowledge that the use of univariate logistic re-
gression in our study limits our ability to control for some
key confounders within our analysis. We therefore reiter-
ate that the relationship between ROSCA membership
and its associated social capital, NHIF enrolment and the
explanatory variables is associative rather than causative
within the context of our study. Further, the urban setting
of this study limits its external validity in rural areas.
Nevertheless, this article provides an insight into the
transmutability of social capital from the local level to na-
tional level. It also provides an insight into how an
in-depth understanding of the social and economic char-
acteristics of target populations can feed into in the design
of national-level schemes. Our study has several design
limitations that may affect the external validity of our
study: the study took place in the transitory period during
which changes to NHIF rates and benefits for the informal
sector were being negotiated. Due to this context, the
study’s applicability may be affected by the new NHIF vol-
untary health insurance regime.
Conclusion
This study examined the influence of ROSCA member-
ship and social capital on voluntary health insurance
enrolment. We posit that socially disadvantaged groups
may accrue strong bridging social capital by participat-
ing in ROSCAs in resource-poor areas. However, we
suggest that the full benefits of social capital in increas-
ing health insurance demand can only be accrued by
taking into account the underlying economic situation
of the target population. We note that the educational
and financial situation of a household serves as a strong
indicator of its capacity to make investment decisions,
including signing up to a voluntary health insurance
scheme. It is therefore important to anchor outreach to
ROSCAs within a broader, multi-pronged approach that
targets households within their social, economic and
political realities. These findings are particularly rele-
vant to countries that may seek to increase voluntary
health insurance coverage through local associations: it
is important to understand the demographic challenges
of these groups and utilise several strategies and target-
ing mechanisms to ensure equitable access to health in-
surance for all citizens.
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